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The paper examines the relationship between tax evasion and individuals’ well-being by using
a subjective question on life satisfaction in fourteen Central and Eastern European countries.
The paper focuses on the role of institutions and social capital in molding this relationship.
The results indicate that evading taxes is negatively associated with individuals’ life satisfaction.
This negative relationship seems to be shaped by a positive perception of formal tax-related in-
stitutions and a high level of formal social capital. A similar analysis run for two generational
groups, distinguished in terms of whether having had working experience during communism,
yields further interesting results: while associational engagement (i.e. formal social capital) has
a crucial role to the younger generation in the way they experience the relationship between
evading tax and how satisﬁed they are with their life, for the older generation it is their social
networks (i.e. informal social capital) that shape this relationship.
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1. Introduction
An important episode in the previous century was the rise and fall of communist economies in Central and Eastern Europe and
the Baltic States. The collapse of these economies led to the emergence of the so-called transition countries, which were charac-
terized by rapid economic and institutional change. This transformation has been accompanied by the appearance of a substantial
amount of undeclared work (Feige and Urban, 2008; Schneider et al., 2011; Williams and Round 2010,). This is typically described
as ´income from productive economic activities which are legal and taxable, but on which income tax, social security contribu-
tions, VAT, etc. are not paid, because they are not reported to the tax, social security or customs authorities’ (Feld and Larsen,
2005). Though tax evasion is seen as one aspect of engaging in undeclared work, some studies argue that saving taxes is not
the primary goal of concealing such work from the authorities (Feld and Larsen, 2012; Feld and Schneider, 2010). Other studies,
on the other hand, seem to indicate that in former communist countries in particular, evading taxes is an important motive for
individuals engaging in undeclared work (Gërxhani, 2004a; Meriküll and Staehr, 2008; Schneider and Enste 2000).1 This has to
do with the communist legacy, as individuals were not used to paying taxes during communism (Kornai, 1990) and thus showed
a strong resistance to do so during transition (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000; Torgler 2003a). Engaging in undeclared work
is one way of expressing such resistance to paying taxes.
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From an economic and social perspective, doing undeclared work has important consequences both at the individual and at
the societal level. In this paper, we focus on the aspect of tax evasion related to undeclared work and its impact on the individual.
To this end, we examine the relationship between tax evasion and individuals’ well-being, by using a subjective question on life
satisfaction in fourteen Central and Eastern European countries.
To the best of our knowledge, there are two studies that have looked at related issues.2 One focuses on a developed country
(i.e. Germany) and ﬁnds a positive relationship between life satisfaction and tax payments (Akay et al., 2012). Although in the
short run paying taxes reduces individuals’ income, tax payments might increase life satisfaction for different reasons. First, indi-
viduals might feel satisﬁed about paying taxes that contribute to public goods (Frey et al., 2009; Levinson, 2012; Luechinger and
Raschky, 2009) and to a sustainable social security system (Alesina et al., 2004). Second, individuals might be worried about the
future impact of evading taxes today. For example, they may not receive or have rights to social beneﬁts (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Gërxhani, 2011). Individuals might also experience a utility loss by failing on their civic duty to contribute to the society (Frey and
Stutzer, 2001; Orviska and Hudson, 2002) or by not being able to contribute to the welfare of others (i.e. the warm glow effect;
Andreoni, 1990). In fact, in a study for Italy, Lubian and Zarri (2011) found that individuals with an intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes are more satisﬁed with their life and neurological evidence seems to indicate that individuals get pleasure from donating
and paying taxes (Harbaugh et al., 2007).
The other study focuses on a former communist country (i.e. Albania) and examines the relationship between subjective ﬁnan-
cial satisfaction and participation in the (in)formal sector by allowing for individual heterogeneity in terms of their tax morale
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani, 2011). The main ﬁnding is that for most individuals in Albania, working in the informal sector
is negatively correlated with their ﬁnancial satisfaction (on top of the differential income effect). For the few individuals with low
tax morale, the correlation was positive.
A general overview of the literature in less developed and former communist countries points at twomain perspectives on engaging
in undeclared work. The so-called ´exit´ perspective emphasizes the entrepreneurial spirit of the participants, who voluntarily choose to
work informally due to more ﬂexibility, better wages, fewer taxes, and less regulations compared to the formal sector (Biles, 2009;
Maloney, 2004; Perry et al., 2007). The so-called ´exclusion´ perspective, on the other hand, argues that engagement in undeclared
work is not a matter of choice and is typically characterized by low wages, poor working conditions, and insecurity (i.e. job insecurity
and exclusion from social beneﬁts) (Banerjee, 1982; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Heckman and Hotz, 1986; Pisani and Pagán, 2003;
Pradhan and van Soest, 1995; Thomas, 1990). According to this perspective, undeclaredwork (and tax evasion) is thus a question of sur-
vival or exclusion, due to a limited number of jobs available in the formal sector and aweakwelfare state support (Ahmad 2008; Castells
and Portes, 1989; Sassen, 1997). The literature argues that the exclusion perspective seems to be particularly relevant for undeclared
work in former communist countries (Cichocki, 2014; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani, 2011; Gërxhani, 2004a; Schneider and Enste,
2000; Torgler, 2003a; Williams, 2014). In a study of unreported employment in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Meriküll and Staehr
(2008) conclude that “individuals take up informal employment not because there is substantial monetary gain, but because they cannot
ﬁnd employment in the formal sector.” (p. 664). In another study on undeclaredwork in Germany, it appears that even after the reunion,
individuals in East Germany consider engagement in undeclared work more important and acceptable than individuals living in the
Western part (Feld and Larsen, 2012).
In line with all the above literature, we expect the negative relationship between evading taxes by engaging in undeclared
work and individuals´ subjective well-being to hold for a broader set of Central and Eastern European countries. In addition to
an empirical test of this hypothesis, we extend on the previous literature by introducing the role of the social and institutional
context in shaping the relationship between tax evasion and well-being. We do so by allowing for individual heterogeneity in
terms of a variety of factors related to the context an individual is embedded in.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 presents the data, the econometric model and
the details about the variables used in the empirical test, Section 4 shows and discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. The role of the social and institutional context
The standard view of tax compliance in tax theory is that taxes are a ‘burden’ or windfall harm. The chief problem in norma-
tive taxation theory is to devise taxes which minimize the ‘excess burden’, i.e., how to minimize the total burden of taxation.
Based on an adaptation of the standard crime model (Becker, 1968), Allingham and Sandmo (1972) introduced a formal model
where tax evasion is part of an optimal portfolio choice: the individual who chooses to evade taxes in effect makes a risky bet
that she will not be caught and convicted. If the latter were to happen, this would be the costs incurred by evading taxes. The
beneﬁts, on the other hand, are primarily of ﬁnancial nature (i.e. more individual income). However, various studies on tax com-
pliance argue that such a model has shortcomings because even when detection and punishment rates are low, individuals do pay
taxes (e.g. Alm et al., 2010; Dulleck et al., 2016; Feld and Frey, 2007; Feld and Schneider 2010; Frey and Torgler, 2007). These
studies show that compliance with taxes is more frequent than the standard economic theory of tax evasion would predict if
one takes account of individual tax morale, good governance, trust in government and in other taxpayers, etc. These aspects in-
crease the costs of evading to the extent that they might outweigh the beneﬁts, leading to more tax compliance than predicted by
the original model. This is, these aspects increase the beneﬁts of complying with taxes, which in turn is reﬂected in the positive
effect of compliance on well-being. In other words, people may feel satisﬁed about paying taxes because doing so they contribute,
2 Note that there is also research looking at the determinants of tax morale in transition countries and Latin America (Torgler, 2003a, 2005a). Their main ﬁnding is
that ﬁnancial satisfaction, satisfaction with life or happiness have a signiﬁcant positive effect on tax morale.
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among others, to public goods, to other's welfare, and to a moral and civic duty towards the society (see e.g. Andreoni, 1990; Frey
et al., 2009; Frey and Stutzer, 2001; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Luechinger and Raschky, 2009). Drawing from a recent experimental
study that ﬁnds that ‘higher psychic stress increases tax compliance’ (Dulleck et al., 2016), it is also likely that paying taxes makes
people happy because it reduces stress.
In this paper we investigate further the relationship between tax evasion and life satisfaction by focusing on social and insti-
tutional factors that previous studies have shown to be relevant for individual tax evasion. These are tax-related institutions, both
formal (i.e. rules and laws) and informal (i.e. social norms) (North, 1990), and social capital, also formal (i.e. donations to asso-
ciations) and informal (i.e. networks of families, friends, and neighbors) (Paxton, 1999).
A positive relationship is reported between ineffective formal institutions and tax evasion (Cummings et al., 2009; Easter,
2002; Friedman et al., 2000; Gërxhani, 2004b; Hanousek and Palda, 2004; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Torgler, 2005b; Torgler
and Schneider, 2009, 2007; Uslaner, 2006). This holds particularly in the case of former communist countries where an institu-
tional vacuum emerged after the fall of the communist apparatus, weakening the position of new governments to collect taxes
and hence provide ‘public goods and build trustworthy institutions’ (Torgler, 2012). The main argument is that ineffective or
corrupted formal institutions lead to a decline of civic virtue and loyalty towards public institutions. This in turn leads to low
tax morale that is reﬂected in less tax compliance. In case of the opposite, effective formal institutions are positively associated
with more tax compliance. Therefore, we expect that the negative relationship between evading taxes and satisfaction will be
stronger for those individuals who think that formal institutions do a good job. In fact, various studies show that under-
provision of public goods is negatively associated with life satisfaction (Frey et al., 2009; Levinson, 2012; Luechinger and
Raschky, 2009).
In addition to formal institutions, informal institutions such as social norms and conventions are shown to be also important in
understanding individual behavior in general (North, 1990), and tax evasion behavior in particular (Feige, 1997; Gërxhani 2004b).
A frequently researched aspect of informal institutions is individual tax morale,3 which is reported to be negatively related to tax
compliance (Cummings et al., 2009; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Torgler, 2003a) but positively correlated with life satisfaction
(Lubian and Zarri, 2011). In our study in Albania we found that the negative relationship between working in the informal sector
(and thus evading) and ﬁnancial satisfaction depended on individual tax morale. In fact, the estimated coefﬁcient for working in
the informal sector turned into positive for those individuals with low tax morale (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani, 2011). Thus,
we expect that individuals with positive tax-related social norms will experience a stronger negative relationship between tax
evasion and life satisfaction.
While the relationship between the institutional context and tax behavior has been increasingly studied over the years (Easter,
2002; Feld and Frey, 2002; Hug and Spörri, 2011; Uslaner, 2006), the knowledge on the role of social capital on tax evasion is
more limited.4 Focusing on social capital as trust and cooperative behavior (Knack and Keefer, 1997), Frey and Torgler (2007) dif-
ferentiate between vertical trust (trust between taxpayers and state authorities) and horizontal trust (generalized trust among
taxpayers) in understanding tax morale. They argue that if taxpayers ﬁnd the state trustworthy and believe that other taxpayers
comply with taxes, they will more likely have a high level of tax morale and hence evade less. Focusing on the network aspect of
social capital (i.e. informal social capital), Rose (2000) reports a positive relationship between informal social capital (i.e. networks
of family and friends) and underground activities in Russia. This positive relationship is attributed to the disfunctioning of formal
institutions in former communist countries that “force” people to fall back into their networks and bypass the state. Therefore,
having a network of family and friends that can be supportive can reduce the negative effect of not paying taxes on well-being
and life satisfaction, as own contribution to the welfare state is not seen as necessary. It is thus likely that, for individuals with
a low level of informal social capital, the negative relationship between tax evasion and life satisfaction is stronger. Nevertheless,
considering the horizontal aspect of tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007), one could also argue that having networks of friends and
family with high tax morale would negatively affect the relationship between evading and satisfaction. The main mechanism un-
derlying this effect would be the social control exercised by such a network.
Finally, studies on social capital have focused substantially on participation in civic associations (Putnam, 1993), which we
consider a formal type of social capital. Empirical evidence is shown on how engagement in terms of membership in, volunteering
and donating for associations contributes to a sense of civic responsibility for the public good, and thus decreases non-compliance
behavior (Letki, 2006; Orviska and Hudson, 2002). This effect can however differ depending on the type of associations one par-
ticipates in. The so-called Putnamesque associations, such as educational, sport and art clubs, religious and charitable organiza-
tions, and youth groups, promote more common goals ‘without imposing negative externalities on the rest of the society’. The
so-called Olsonian associations, i.e. political parties and movements, trade unions, professional associations, and various interest
groups, ‘tend to engage in collective action that reconﬁgures redistribution systems in their favor at the expense of the rest of
the society’ (Fidrmuc and Gërxhani, 2008; Knack and Keefer, 1997). Therefore, it is likely that participating in Putnamesque
type of associations and thus having a more civic responsibility will strengthen the negative relationship between evading and
life satisfaction. For individuals participating in the Olsonian type of associations, we expect this relationship to be weaker or
even positive.
3 Tax morale is “the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes arising from the moral obligation to pay taxes as a contribution to society.” (Cummings et al., 2009: 448).
4 Note that the relationship between social capital and life satisfaction has been frequently studied and established to be positive in both developed countries (e.g.
Bjørnskov, 2003; Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2004; Helliwell, 2006; Hudson, 2006; Winkelmann, 2009), and former communist countries (Abbott et al., 2011; Abbott
and Sapsford, 2006; Habibov and Afandi, 2015; Lelkes, 2006).
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3. Methodology
3.1. The data
The data at hand is a product of the “Public Goods through Private Eyes”, a full-scale comparative public opinion survey carried
out in 14 countries in 2013 and 2014 (University of Warsaw). Respondents were nested in 1047 SPs in 14 countries. Response
rate ranged from 39% in Poland and Ukraine to 65% in Hungary, with most countries around 45–50%. The sample selection process
was standardized across all countries: stratiﬁed clustered random sample. Details on the data design can be found in Letki (2015).
The objective of the project was to collect cross-country data on the determinants of public attitudes and behavior towards
public goods in the context of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. The ﬁeld work was carried out in the following four-
teen countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Ukraine. The ﬁnal sample consists of more than 22,000 observations and each country has at least 1400
observations.
Given our focus on undeclared work, the empirical analysis is based exclusively on working individuals. We classify respon-
dents as working if they report that “during the last 7 days they have been in paid work (or away temporarily) (employee,
self-employed, working for family business or a family owned farm)”. This leaves us with 8411 observations. In addition, the em-
pirical analysis includes 1586 individuals who report having an “additional job, something that one does on a more or less regular
basis, not just some sporadic, occasional income”. We classify these individuals as being engaged in moonlighting (i.e. having
more than one job). This “working” sample consists of 9997 observations, a 45% of the total sample of 22039 observations. In ad-
dition, due to missing information, the ﬁrst regression excludes about 1562 individuals. Most importantly, there is a large number
of respondents who do not answer the questions related to institutions and social capital. The regressions that include these var-
iables have about 5119 observations, a 55% of the working population in the sample.
3.2. Empirical model
To test and understand the relationship between individuals’ well-being and tax evasion, we estimate the following life satis-
faction equation:
LSi ¼ α þ TEiβ þ ðTEi $ IiÞφþ ðTEi $ SCiÞζ þ Xiδþ γCc þ φT þ λEi þ εi; ð1Þ
where LS represents the answer to a life satisfaction question, i is the individual, TE indicates tax evasion, I and SC are a set of
proxy variables for individual's opinion about the institutions, and their level of social capital. These two last sets of variables
are expected to mediate in the relationship between tax evasion and life satisfaction. The regression also controls for a standard
set of individual characteristics (Xi), such as income, education, health, and gender; and it includes a time ﬁxed effect (T) as well
as some country characteristics (Cc). The time ﬁxed effect indicates whether the questionnaire was run in 2013 or 2014. In the
regression we include the country GDP and the unemployment rate, as these two variables have been shown to correlate with
individuals’ satisfaction (data from the World Bank). In addition, to proxy for the institutional tax related context, we also include
the corruption perception index (CPI) of the Transparency International. To recognize different cultures within a country, we also
include a set of dummy variables representing the ethnic group in which the individual belongs (E). The errors are clustered at
the country level. Finally, we include the usual error term ε.
An important limitation of our data is that it is cross-sectional. This means that we cannot control for individual time persis-
tent traits: our estimates come from comparing individuals who evade with those who do not (everything else constant) and we
can therefore not rule out that individuals who do evade are different from those who do not. This selection into evading can be
due to either an individual choice (e.g., risk averse individuals might evade less or happy individuals have a higher tax morale and
thus are less likely to evade –Torgler, 2005a, 2003a) or to a demand selection (e.g., low educated individuals might have no choice
but to engage in undeclared work). It has been argued that individuals who participate in undeclared work in former communist
countries are the ones excluded from the formalized labor market (cf. 1). This is, following the literature one can argue that there
is no individual self-selection into undeclared work in these countries. Nevertheless, tax evasion can still be endogenous as indi-
viduals who evade taxes may have differences on a number of observables. In fact, in a regression analysis, we ﬁnd that household
size, age, and gender have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the probability to participate in undeclared work, while education,
marital status, number of children, and sector where the individual works (including self-employment) do not. There are some
small variations depending on the tax evasion measure used. Thus, although we control for many of the variables determining
individuals’ probability to evade, there are some individual characteristics (for example, ethics and job search effort) that we
do not observe.
3.3. Main variables
In what follows we describe the main variables used in the regression analysis.
Subjective well-being: to proxy for individuals’ well-being, we use a self-reported measure of life satisfaction that runs as fol-
lows: “All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” Individuals can cast their answer on
a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means totally dissatisﬁed and 10 is totally satisﬁed.
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The use of this measure as a proxy for utility relies on two main assumptions: measurability (individuals are able and willing
to give a good answer when asked about their satisfaction), and interpersonal comparability (individuals share the same concept
of satisfaction). Empirical evidence accumulated up until now shows that these two assumptions hold. For example, it has been
empirically shown that there is a strong correlation between the above measure of life satisfaction and more objective measures
of well-being, notably expressions such as smiling and frowning (Sandvik et al., 1993); health (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2008;
Steptoe and Wardle, 2005); and physical body reactions, such as psychological stress (Cohen et al., 2006; Hayney et al., 2003) and
brain activity (Urry et al., 2004). In relation to the second assumption, evidence shows that individuals are quite good at
predicting other individuals’ satisfaction (or emotions) by looking at pictures and videos (Diener and Lucas, 1999; Sandvik
et al., 1993). Hence, our measure shares the same concept of life satisfaction, well-being, and emotions.
From an empirical perspective, two aspects need consideration. First, though life satisfaction is coded as a discrete ordered var-
iable, we regress life satisfaction using OLS. There is evidence that assuming cardinality has no impact on the results in terms of
trade-offs between variables (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2005). Second, since the data at hand is cross-sectional, we cannot
control for individual time persistent unobservable personality traits. This is, we cannot control for all those unobservable vari-
ables that are time persistent and correlate with both, tax evasion and satisfaction (e.g., ethics and personality traits). In other
words, the empirical analysis does not compare individuals over time but exploits differences across individuals, which might dif-
fer in aspects other than evading taxes. For details on the subjective well-being measure and related literature see Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2013).
Tax evasion: to capture the taxable unreported income by being engaged in undeclared work, we use the following question
“Has it ever happened that you worked for cash in hand payment and did not pay tax on this income?”. This question does
not allow measuring the extension of tax evasion but rather whether an individual has evaded or not by working for cash in
hand payment. A subsequent question asks respondents when this happened and answers can be casted in three categories: with-
in the last 12 months, within the last 5 years, but not within the last 12 months, and more than 5 years ago. In the empirical
analysis we include those individuals who report to have evaded not more than 5 years ago. This allows us to focus only on fairly
recent evasion episodes and avoid undeclared work that took place, for example, during the communist period. The tax evasion
variable can take a value 0 or 1, where 1 indicates that individual engaged in undeclared activities within the last 5 years.
Tax-related formal institutions (i.e. rules and laws) variable is captured by using two measures. The ﬁrst measures the extent
to which people agree or disagree (on a 1 –strongly agree- to 5 –strongly disagree- point scale) on whether: (a) the tax system is
overly complex; (b) the tax system may not be perfect, but it works well for most people; (c) the tax system is unfair; (d) the
government spends taxpayers’ money effectively; and (e) the government is wasting a lot of public money. The answers to
these questions are recoded and added up so that a higher value indicates a positive perception of tax-related formal institutions.
This variable ranges from 5 to 25. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefﬁcient of this constructed variable is 0.6221.
The second measure is related to individuals’ perception about government provision of public goods. We generate a discrete var-
iable that takes value 1 if a respondent thinks that the government underprovides in all the following services: education,
healthcare, social beneﬁts, police, judiciary, army and defense, infrastructure, and environment protection. If not, the variable
takes value 0. The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefﬁcient of this constructed variable is 0.7483.
Tax-related informal institutions (i.e. social norms) variable is measured by whether respondents agree or strongly agree on
that: (i) paying taxes for me is an obvious thing to do; (ii) I consider paying taxes to be my civic duty; (iii) I am happy that
by paying taxes I support the state and other citizens; (iv) paying taxes for me is a natural thing to do; (v) most people claim
larger tax deductions than they are entitled to; and (vi) most people who work for cash in hand payments pay taxes on this in-
come. Statements (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) capture the tax morale aspect of the tax-related informal institutions, whereas (v) and (vi)
capture the conditional cooperation aspect (see Frey and Torgler, 2007 for more details). If individuals strongly agree or agree
(answering 4 or 5 on a 1 to 5 scale) with all six statements, the variable takes value 6 and it means that respondents have a pos-
itive attitude towards tax-related informal institutions in their country. In the opposite case, the variable takes value 0. This var-
iable can thus range from 0 to 6.
In line with Putnam's (2001) ﬁnding that the frequency of charitable contributions in the US over time has been highly cor-
related with membership in voluntary organizations, we capture the formal type of social capital by the number of charities or
associations that the respondent has supported with ﬁnancial donations within the past 12 months (a.k.a. ‘philanthropic generos-
ity’). The list includes associations related to the following: religion, politics, education, environment, sport, arts psychological
support and therapy, local community, people in need, labor rights, human rights and peace, children or youth, consumer protec-
tion, health and patients’ rights, and developing countries. As discussed in Section 2, we classify these associations into two
groups: Putnamesque and Olsonian associations. These variables can range from 0 (when individuals do not ﬁnancially support
any association) to 5 for Putnamesque associations or to 6 for Olsonian associations. The data also contains information on mem-
bership and volunteering in these same associations. These two variables however show problems of multicollinearity with a cor-
relation of about 0.6. The correlation between these two variables and the one of ﬁnancially supporting these associations is
instead very low. Therefore, the empirical analysis can include volunteering (or membership) and ﬁnancial support, but not all
three. Since including volunteering or being a member of these associations did not show any relevance for the analysis (its co-
efﬁcients were small and statistically insigniﬁcant, and its inclusion did not change the other coefﬁcients or their signiﬁcance), for
reasons of simplicity, the ﬁnal speciﬁcation only includes information on whether the individual ﬁnancially supports any of these
associations.
Informal type of social capital (i.e. networks of families, friends, and neighbors) is measured with the frequency in which people
meet socially with their close circle of relations. This is family, friends, and neighbors. Individuals can respond on a discrete scale
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ranging from 1 (every day) to 7 (never/almost never). The aggregate variable can take values from 3 (individuals who meet every
day with relations from the three groups) to 21 (individuals who almost never meet with any of the three groups of relations).
In addition to these variables, the regression analysis includes a set of individual and household characteristics, some of which
might be correlated with both, well-being and tax evasion. These are: household income in purchasing power parity, household
composition (number of adults and of children living in the household), education level, age, gender, health status, religiosity, and
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the working sample.
N Mean St. Dv.
Life satisfaction 9875 6.65 2.12
Tax evasion (last 5 years) 9987 0.10 0.30
Frequency meets family, friends & neighbors (often to never) 9780 10.25 4.05
# Putnam associations one ﬁnancially supports 9756 0.20 0.49
# Olson associations one ﬁnancially supports 9753 0.52 0.77
Positive attitude towards tax-related informal institutions 8179 2.90 1.42
Positive perception of tax-related formal institutions 8685 12.23 3.57
Individual reports under-provision of public goods 7392 0.21 0.41
Household income (PPP) 9939 7187 30406
Missing information on household income 9997 0.38 0.49
Household size 9974 2.93 1.38
Number of children in the household 9926 0.66 0.92
Age 9997 44.66 12.58
Individual is a male 9997 0.47 0.50
Individual is married 9923 0.70 0.46
Education level (low to high) 9958 4.05 1.75
Main occupation in (reference: other sector):
Public sector 9258 0.35 0.48
Private sector 9258 0.53 0.50
Self-employment 9258 0.11 0.31
Moonlighting 9493 0.17 0.37
Daily life affected by health? (reference: yes, signiﬁcantly):
Yes, to some degree 9939 0.10 0.30
Yes, slightly 9939 0.17 0.37
No 9939 0.70 0.46
Belongs to a church / denomination 9997 0.61 0.49
Table 2
Life satisfaction and tax evasion, baseline regression.
Coeff. p-value
Constant 6.369 0.00
Tax evasion (last 5 years) −0.302 0.00
Control variables
Household income (PPP) 0.000 0.72
Missing information on household income 0.211 0.00
Household size 0.066 0.02
Number of children in the household −0.064 0.10
Age −0.075 0.00
Age squared 0.001 0.00
Individual is a male 0.003 0.96
Individual is married 0.338 0.00
Education level (low to high) 0.141 0.00
Main occupation (ref. private sector)
Public sector 0.110 0.05
Self-employment 0.233 0.01
Other sector 0.568 0.02
Moonlighting 0.147 0.08
Daily life affected by health? (reference: yes, signiﬁcantly):
Yes, to some degree 0.465 0.01
Yes, slightly 0.668 0.00
No 0.944 0.00
Belong to church /denomination 0.098 0.17
GDP per capita 0.000 0.03
Unemployment rate −0.012 0.65
Corruption Index (CPI) −0.017 0.26
Number of observations 8435
R-Square 0.129
Note: The regression also includes dummy variables for ethnic group and year of the interview. Errors are clustered at the country level and design weights are
used.
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marital status of the respondent. We also include a set of variables related to the respondent's employment characteristics:
whether respondents work in the public or private sector, whether they are self-employed, or report moonlighting activities. Fi-
nally, since there is a large number of individuals who do not report their income (about 38% of our sub-sample of working in-
dividuals), we include a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent does not report income. In this case, the variable
household income takes value 0.
In Table 1 below we show the descriptive statistics of our ﬁnal sample of working individuals.
4. Results
4.1. Results for the total sample
We ﬁrst present baseline results in Table 2 (above). The results show a clear and strong negative correlation between life sat-
isfaction and tax evasion of about 0.3. The coefﬁcient of tax evasion is statistically signiﬁcant at 0.2%. This coefﬁcient is similar to
the one of being married. This is, individuals are indifferent, in terms of life satisfaction, between being married and evading taxes.
Thus as expected, people who evade in former communist countries are less satisﬁed with their life in general.
The control variables do not offer any surprising result. Although household income is not statistically signiﬁcant, the variable
indicating that an individual did not report their income is positively correlated with life satisfaction. This means that individuals
who do not report their income share some unobservable common characteristics that are positively correlated with reported life
satisfaction. Household size is positively related to life satisfaction and the number of children in the household has a negative
correlation with life satisfaction, although only signiﬁcant at 10%. Age shows an inverted-U shape with a minimum satisfaction
level at around 55 years old. Gender has no signiﬁcant effect, while education level is positively correlated with satisfaction.
This might mean that higher educated individuals have on average better jobs and more opportunities than the lower educated.
Everything else constant, individuals working in the private sector are less satisﬁed than public workers or individuals self-
employed. Moonlighting show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation with life satisfaction Good health is positively cor-
related with life satisfaction. The GDP per capita is positively correlated with satisfaction, but the unemployment rate or the cor-
ruption index does not show a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. When the regression analysis controls for individuals’ perception
of the formal an informal institutions in the country (Tables 3 and 4), the coefﬁcient for the GDP remains positive and signiﬁcant,
unemployment rate shows a negative and statistically coefﬁcient sign, and corruption is negative but only statistically signiﬁcant
for individuals older than 45 (Table 4).
Next, we introduce the main independent variables that capture individuals’ perceptions and attitudes related to (formal and
informal) institutions and their level of (formal and informal) social capital. Table 3 shows the results. Introducing these variables
in the analysis has little effect on the rest of explanatory variables, except for the country variables (GDP, unemployment rate, and
corruption index), as already discussed.
The results presented in Table 3 indicate the importance of some institutions and social capital on shaping the relationship be-
tween tax evasion and satisfaction. The last two columns of the table show the Wald test for the interaction terms (F value and
the probability that are statistically signiﬁcant from zero).
Table 3
Life satisfaction, tax evasion, and the role of institutions and social capital.
Coeff. p
Wald test
F(1, 970) Prob
Constant 6.395 0.00
Tax evasion (last 5 years) 0.313 0.52
Interaction terms:
Tax evasion (last 5 years) * the following variables
Frequency meets family, friends & neighbors (often to never) −0.043 0.11 2.51 0.11
# Putnam associations one ﬁnancially supports −0.696 0.00 10.15 0.00
# Olson associations one ﬁnancially supports 0.373 0.01 6.84 0.01
Positive attitude towards tax-related informal institutions −0.091 0.27 1.24 0.27
Positive perception of tax-related formal institutions −0.001 0.99 0.00 0.99
Individual reports under-provision of public goods 0.667 0.01 7.92 0.01
The variables in levels:
Frequency meets family, friends & neighbors (often to never) −0.022 0.03
# Putnam associations one ﬁnancially supports 0.139 0.07
# Olson associations one ﬁnancially supports 0.092 0.05
Positive attitude towards tax-related informal institutions 0.116 0.00
Positive perception of tax-related formal institutions 0.069 0.00
Individual reports under-provision of public goods 0.003 0.98
Number of observations 5519
R-Square 0.166
Note: The regression also includes all controls present in Table 2. Errors are clustered at the country level and design weights are used.
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Three out of the six interactions between tax evasion and variables capturing the social and institutional context are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at 1%. One of the two measures used to proxy formal institutions has a mediating role in the relation between tax
evasion and satisfaction, namely the individuals’ perception about government provision of public goods. For individuals who
think that the government is underproviding public services (about 21% of the sample), tax evasion and life satisfaction are pos-
itively correlated. These results provide support for the arguments made earlier that when individuals think that formal institu-
tions do a good job, they are not satisﬁed with the fact that they are evading.
Informal institutions however do not seem to matter in shaping the correlation between satisfaction and tax evasion. This ﬁnd-
ing seems to be in line with empirical evidence on the tax morale of East and West Germans after the reuniﬁcation, namely that
East Germans’ tax morale has been decreasing since the reuniﬁcation (Torgler, 2003b).
The informal type of social capital (measured by the frequency with which individuals meet with friends, family and neigh-
bors) is negatively correlated with life satisfaction. The interaction between this variable and tax evasion is however only statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 11% level. The formal type of social capital, on the other hand, does have a mediating role on the
correlation between tax evasion and satisfaction. As expected, we ﬁnd that: (i) the more Putnamesque associations individuals
ﬁnancially support, the higher is the negative correlation between tax evasion and life satisfaction; while (ii) the opposite is
true for Olsonian associations. Contributing to any of the two types of associations is positively correlated with individual life sat-
isfaction, although the effect is larger for Putnamesque associations. In the next section, we discuss this in more detail.
4.2. Results by generation
In an interesting study of tax morale in an East-West-German comparison after the German reuniﬁcation, Torgler (2003b) ar-
gues that social norms people used to adhere to before the reuniﬁcation matter in their post-communist tax morale. This should
even be more the case for the older generation as they “were exposed for a longer time to an environment where social-norm
adherence was important” (p. 509). The main ﬁnding is that East Germans had a higher level of tax morale than the West
Germans both in 1990 (after the reuniﬁcation) and in 1997, but that the high tax morale has decreased over this period. This
Table 4
Life satisfaction, tax evasion, and the role of institutions and social capital by generation.
45 or Younger Older than 45
Coeff. p Coeff. p
Constant 8.071 0.00 5.887 0.02
Tax evasion (last 5 years) −0.296 0.59 1.874 0.01
Interaction terms:
Tax evasion (last 5 years) * the following variables
Frequency meets family, friends & neighbors (often to never) −0.022 0.52 −0.106 0.01
# Putnam associations one ﬁnancially supports −0.870 0.00 −0.223 0.58
# Olson associations one ﬁnancially supports 0.416 0.01 0.203 0.38
Positive attitude towards tax-related informal institutions −0.080 0.50 −0.043 0.72
Positive perception of tax-related formal institutions 0.028 0.51 −0.078 0.13
Individual reports under-provision of public goods 0.600 0.04 0.786 0.06
The variables in levels:
Frequency meets family, friends & neighbors (often to never) −0.014 0.29 −0.028 0.04
# Putnam associations one ﬁnancially supports 0.182 0.07 0.068 0.52
# Olson associations one ﬁnancially supports 0.111 0.08 0.079 0.20
Positive attitude towards tax-related informal institutions 0.098 0.00 0.130 0.00
Positive perception of tax-related formal institutions 0.065 0.00 0.075 0.00
Individual reports under-provision of public goods −0.047 0.68 0.016 0.90
Number of observations 2669 2450
R-Square 0.176 0.171
Note: The regression also includes all controls present in Table 2. Errors are clustered at the country level and design weights are used.
Table 5
Wald test of the role of institutions and social capital by generation.
45 or Younger Older than 45
Wald Test Wald Test
F(1,855) Prob F(1,855) Prob
Interaction terms with Tax evasion (last 5 years)
Frequency meets family, friends & neighbors (often to never) 0.420 0.52 6.390 0.01
# Putnam associations one ﬁnancially supports 12.130 0.00 0.310 0.58
# Olson associations one ﬁnancially supports 6.690 0.01 0.790 0.38
Positive attitude towards tax-related informal institutions 0.460 0.50 0.130 0.72
Positive perception of tax-related formal institutions 0.450 0.50 2.310 0.13
Individual reports under-provision of public goods 4.440 0.35 3.590 0.06
Note: Tests are based on regression results presented in Table 4.
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ﬁnding is primarily attributed to the more strict social norms of obeying to the GDR state apparatus that the East Germans were
exposed to, which have started to erode almost a decade after the reuniﬁcation. In line with this study, we present additional re-
sults dividing our sample into two: those who did and those who did not have working experience during the communist period.
This is, individuals who were younger than 45 years old in 2013/2014 and those who were 45 or older. Through this division we
aim to capture possible social norms and experiences related to the communist legacy. In line with Torgler's (2003b) ﬁnding, our
data show that the average tax morale is higher for those individuals 45 or older and the difference with the younger sample is
statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4 shows the regression results when we divide the sample into these two groups, whereas Table 5 presents the Wald
test of statistical signiﬁcance of the mediating role of institutions and social capital on the relationship between tax evasion
and life satisfaction.
The results indicate that only those 6% of older individuals who meet with family, friends and neighbors very often have a neg-
ative relationship between tax evasion and life satisfaction. For the rest, the relationship is positive. In fact, the data does not show
any meditating role of tax morale on the correlation between tax evasion and satisfaction. It seems that the role of tax morale is
indirectly captured by the importance of networks (meeting with family, friends and neighbors) for the older generation only.
Such importance may have its roots in the communist period known for a tighter social control and a higher level of tax morale
(Torgler, 2003b). Therefore, we believe that the concept of horizontal trust (Frey and Torgler, 2007) is relevant here, as the social
control through networks may be making the older generation unhappier about evading than the younger one. This is in line with
our argument that having networks of friends and family with high tax morale would negatively affect the relationship between
evading and satisfaction.
Formal tax-related institutions do play a role for both generations. Individuals who think that the government underprovides
public services are less negatively affected by evading taxes. This is in line with the literature (Cummings et al., 2009; Easter,
2002; Friedman et al., 2000; Gërxhani, 2004b; Hanousek and Palda, 2004; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Torgler, 2005b; Torgler
and Schneider, 2009, 2007; Uslaner, 2006), which argues that this ﬁnding holds particularly in the case of former communist
countries (Torgler, 2012).
The role of social capital, on the other hand, differs substantially between the two groups. For the younger generation, the ﬁ-
nancial support of associations (i.e. formal social capital) has a mediating role in the relationship between tax evasion and satis-
faction, whereas for the older generation it is their social networks (i.e. informal social capital) that shape this relationship. It
seems that associational engagement has a crucial role to the younger generation in the way they experience the relationship be-
tween evading tax and how satisﬁed they are with their life.
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that for the younger generation engagement in Putnamesque associations strengthens the negative
relationship between evading and life satisfaction. For individuals participating in the Olsonian type of associations, this relation-
ship is reversed. This is, young individuals who ﬁnancially support at least one Olsonian type of association experience a positive
relationship between evading and satisfaction. In other words, the ones who support the more rent-seeking type of associations
are instead happy about their tax evasion behavior. It seems that if the association they support is driven by more common goals
‘without imposing negative externalities on the rest of the society’, the young individuals are more unhappy about evading as
they believe in their civic duty. Whereas those young individuals who support associations that ‘tend to engage in collective ac-
tion that reconﬁgures redistribution systems in their favor at the expense of the rest of the society’ (Olsonian) might think that
these associations are better in providing for their welfare than the state. Therefore, ﬁnancially supporting these associations re-
verts the negative relationship between tax evasion and satisfaction.
5. Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was to examine the relationship between tax evasion and subjective well-being in former com-
munist countries. The latter are characterized by large individual engagements in undeclared work and, more importantly, mainly
for survival reasons. The paper contributes to the literature on understanding tax evasion in former communist countries as well
as the effect that the current context and the past legacy has on shaping the relationship between tax evasion and individual life
satisfaction.
Using a subjective measure of satisfaction (individual well-being) in fourteen Central and Eastern European countries we iden-
tiﬁed on average a negative relationship between tax evasion and life satisfaction. This relationship, however, showed a clear het-
erogeneity across individuals distinguished by their experience of the social and institutional context. This is, the social and
institutional context in which individuals are embedded play an important role in mediating this negative relationship.
Focusing on the role of the social and institutional context is particularly relevant in these countries, as they have gone
through drastic social, economic, and institutional changes. Our ﬁndings support this by showing that social and institutional fac-
tors do matter in shaping the relationship between tax evasion and life satisfaction. More particularly, the mediating role of social
capital depends on the type one has access to. Individuals engaged in various civically-oriented type of associations experience a
negative correlation between tax evasion and satisfaction. Interestingly, this negative relationship becomes positive for those in-
dividuals who have access to and ﬁnancially support ‘rent-seeking’ associations. Regarding the institutional factors the results in-
dicate that individuals who believe that the government is doing a good job in providing public services, experience a negative
relationship between tax evasion and life satisfaction.
These ﬁndings are in line with what we expected from the literature and most importantly hint at an ‘exclusion’ situation in
former communist countries. This, however, depends on the context an individual lives in. While for some individuals tax evasion
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is not negatively associated with life satisfaction, the way they experience various social and institutional factors turns this rela-
tionship into negative. This implies that if these individuals had a choice, they would rather enter a formalized labor market.
Moreover, we show that the social norms and experiences related to the communist legacy still matter, as the older generation
seems to experience the relationship between tax evasion and well-being differently than the younger generation. As to be ex-
pected, these legacies of the past are more present in the tax-related behavior of the older generation most of whom show a pos-
itive correlation between tax evasion and satisfaction. In fact, only those individuals with strong networks show a negative
relationship between evading and satisfaction. We argue that such strong social networks may operate through social control
on the ones who evade, hence making the latter group unhappy about evading. This social control appears to be relevant only
for those individuals who have experienced the communist period, a time with tighter social control and higher tax morale.
The younger generation, on the other hand, seems to be affected by their participation in associations through ﬁnancial dona-
tions. However, this effect varies depending on the type of association one supports. Young individuals who are more keen in
supporting civic-oriented associations are unhappy about the uncivic act of evading taxes. A careful interpretation might be
that if they have no choice but to evade, they try to ‘compensate’ by contributing to civic associations. As for those young indi-
viduals supporting rent-seeking associations, evading taxes seems to make them more satisﬁed with their life. It is likely that
they have more faith in this type of associations to increase their well-being than the state itself. This is why they rather support
such associations than pay taxes to the state.
Though we were able to use a unique data set that helps to better understand citizens’ attitudes towards public goods in four-
teen former communist countries, the data is cross-sectional, thus it does not allow controlling for individual time persistent
traits. In addition, the measure of tax evasion used in the paper suffers from two main limitations: it is self-reported and it is
only measured through one question. If individuals feel threatened or uncomfortable about reporting their undeclared activities,
we expect that our measure of tax evasion is biased and we cannot exclude underreporting.
Our results do however indicate some evidence on theoretical arguments that the decision to comply or not is often condi-
tioned by the institutional structure that prevailed in the pre-transition period (Feige, 1997; Torgler 2003b). Although more re-
search is needed to look closely at the relationships examined here, our ﬁndings point to the importance of good functioning
institutions and associational engagement. The fact that the latter is more prominent among the younger generation suggests
the beginning of a break-up with the communist legacy of the past.
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